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Articles
Greg Craven*

Of Federalism, Secession,

Canada and Quebec
I. Introduction
This article' does not seek to examine comprehensively either the
political or the legal intricacies of the possible secession of Quebec from
Canada. To either task, the author's knowledge would be unequal. 2 In
general terms, all that is aimed at here is the very modest goal of bringing
to bear upon the present Quebec-Canada scenario perceptions garnered
from a consideration of similar (though different) situations which have3
arisen in other federations, and especially in the Australian federation.
More specifically, what is attempted is three things. First, a brief
discussion is undertaken of the concept of secession as such. Second,
secession is considered as a phenomenon within the context of federal
states. Finally, an account is given of some of the typical features of a
secession crisis within a federal state. Throughout, an effort is made to
relate this more general discussion specifically to the situation of Quebec
and the possibility that it will seek to secede from Canada. Regrettably,
the most obvious theme to emerge from this piece is that Canada and
Quebec show- many signs of treading the same well-worn path towards
secession that has been followed by so many federations and their
constituent regions.
II. Secession
It is, perhaps, cold comfort to a Canadian that secession is in the air not
only on the streets of Quebec. From its usual place as an unobtrusive
foot-note in texts of political science and international and constitutional
law, secession has lately barged its way to the forefront of national and
international affairs. Thus, not only is the possible secession of Quebec a
cocktail party subject around Canada, but the apparently imminent
*B.A., LL.M. (Melb.), Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Melbourne; Visiting AssociateProfessor, University of British Columbia.
1. The paper upon which this piece is based was presented at a seminar at Dalhousie Law
School, September 12, 1999.
2. The author's particular knowledge lies in the field of Australian secession: see G. Craven,
Secession: The Ultimate StatesRight (1985) (hereafter referred to as Secession).
3. When the State of Western Australia attempted to secede: see eg. Secession, ch. 3; E. Watt,
"Secession in Western Australia', [1958] University Studies in Western AustralianHistory 43.
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disintegration of the Soviet Union enlivens the food queues of Moscow
and Kiev. The U.S.S.R., always in theory federal - and even possessed
of a Constitution guaranteeing a right of secession to its constituent
republics4 - had until recently represented for most practical purposes
the paradigmatic monolithic state. Now, however, there are secessionist
movements afoot in virtually all of the republics. While the best known
of these movements are in the Baltic republics, there exist similar
pressures in the Ukraine, throughout the Moslem south, and even the
Russian republic itself has threatened to secede from the Union. There is
every chance that the U.S.S.R. as we now know it will cease to exist as
a result of the secession movements presently unfolding.
Meanwhile, Russia's near neighbour, Yugoslavia, appears irrevocably
destined for dismemberment at the hands of its quarrelling member
republics. Even as far away as the South Pacific, New Guinea is facing
the gravest crisis of its short nationhood as the copper-rich island of
Bougainville seeks to break away - taking its wealth with it - in a
scenario displaying similarities to that played out between Katanga and
the Congo during the period 1960-1963. Canada is thus not the only state
facing the danger of secession at the present moment, nor are the
separatist tendencies of Quebec the most (or the least) profound presently
to be discerned around the world. It is conceded, of course, that company
offers but little reassurance in such circumstances.
'Secession' is not a term much bandied about in general conversation,
and it is as well to fix its meaning at this early stage. It derives from the
latin secessionem, a withdrawal. 5 In its more general application, it can
be used to refer to an attempt by any group of a state's citizens to
withdraw themselves from the constitutional authority of that state and to
found an independent polity of their own.6 Indeed, as applied to unitary
states, the term will frequently be applied in precisely this sense, as is the
case with the secession movement of Bougainville against New7 Guinea,
or the perennial attempts of the Kurds to found their own State.
However, in its application to federal states, 'secession' will ordinarily
have a distinctively different meaning. In these states, a secession will
comprise the attempt by one of the formally constituted component
regions of the state to withdraw from the federation and to maintain its

4. Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Article 17.
5. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1964),
p. 825.
6. This is the sense in which the term is used in such works as G. Buchheit, Secessiorn the
Legitimacy ofself-Detenmination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
7. 'bid, pp. 153- 62 .
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identity as an independent political entity. 8 Such an attempt by some
more informally defined group of citizens, however clearly that group
might be delineated in terms of race or territory occupied, will more
properly be termed a 'separation'. 9 There may lurk some at least symbolic
significance in this apparently unimportant terminological difference.
Perhaps owing to its use by such sophisticated pre-Civil War thinkers as
Calhoun, secession in its federal context carries with it echoes of a
compact theory of federation,10 and a greater flavour of internal
constitutional legitimacy than the notion of mere 'separation'.
So, the American Civil War is notoriously 'The War of Secession', not
'The War of Separation', and the Australians invariably talk of the
'Western Australian Secession Movement'. Curiously, in the case of
Quebec, references to Quebec or French 'separatism' are about as
common as those involving the use of the term secession. 1 Whether this
arises from some desire to down-play the legitimacy of any action which
Quebec might take, or from a recognition that a claim by Quebec of a
right to leave Canada will ultimately draw upon considerations far
broader than its formal constitutional status as a constituent region, it is
difficult to say. Nevertheless, in conventional usage, when a federal unit
seeks to leave its parent federation it is attempting to secede, and so the
question of whether Quebec can or will leave Canada is one of its
secession, rather than its separation.
The essence of secession as the term is used here, both in relation to
federal and non-federal states, is that it will involve the attempt by a
section of an existing state to take itself outside the constitutional,
political and legal structures of that state. It is, in short, a bid for
independence: after a successful secession, the new polity will not be
subject to the laws and governmental actions of the state of which it
formerly was part. It is important to realize that secession can be achieved
in a variety of ways. Usually, the spectrum of secession is rather clumsily
divided into the 'legal' and the 'illegal'. A legal secession is said to occur
when the relevant territorial unit leaves the parent state in accordance
with the legal norms of that state. There are a number of possibilities
here. The constitution of the state concerned may - especially if it is
federal in character, and the claim for secession is made by a constituent
region - confer an express right of unilateral secession, as did the former

8. See ag.Secession, p. 4.
9. See eg. J. Brossard, Ilaccession 6 la souveraineti et le cas de Quebe" conditions et
modaliMspoiticojuridiques(Montral: Les Presses de l'Universit6 de Montral, 1976), p. 94.
10. As to which, see infra.
11. See ag.D. Matas, 'Can Quebec Separate?' (1975), 21 McGill L. J. 387.
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constitution of the Soviet Union.12 Alternatively, there may be some
implied constitutional right to secede unilaterally, the claim to which is
again most commonly raised by the component regions of federal states.
The best example of such a claim is that articulated by the Southern
States during the American Civil War.1 3 Finally, there will usually be 4t
least the theoretical possibility, in both federal and unitary systems, -of a
constitutional amendment which would permit the secession of a
territory in accordance with the internal law of the state concerned. Such
an amendment will usually require the co-operation of other authorities
within the relevant constitutional order. This was the (unsuccessful)
4
course pursued by both Nova cotiaM
and Western Australia 15 in seeking
United Kingdom amendments to the British North America and
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Acts respectively.
An 'illegal' secession occurs when part of the territory of a state simply
asserts its independence in defiance of the legal structures of the state.
Clearly, such a secession is unlawful as a matter of that state's own
domestic law, but the wider legal position is notoriously more complex.
In the first place, in any given case, there may well be a complicated
intersection between domestic law on the one hand, and international
law - in the form of the right of peoples to self-determination - on the
other. It is not the object of this piece to enter the convoluted debate over
the extent to which this right may modify the operation of municipal
law, 16 but it is clear that its existence can significantly complicate the
claim that a particular secession is 'illegal'. Secondly, while a secession
may be unlawful at the outset, it is a jurisprudential commonplace that
such action may nevertheless produce an ultimately 'legal' regime, in the
sense that successful revolutions by definition make good law.' 7
Consequently, the distinction between a legal and an illegal secession,
however profound in theory, may in practice be a matter of a few days,
or even hours.
It is important to appreciate from the preceding analysis that the
common tendency to automatically equate 'unilateral' with 'domestically
illegal' secession' 8 is unduly simplistic. While unilateral secession will
typically be illegal, in the sense that it will not accord with the internal

12. See supra,note 4.
13. See Secession, pp. 62-74; J. Calhoun, Disquisition on Government in R. Cralle, ed., The
Works ofJohn C. Calhoun.
14. Brossard, supra,note 9, pp. 275-7.
15. See Secession,ch. 3.
16. As to which see eg. Buchheit, supr, note 6, chs. 1-2; Brossard, supra,note 9, pp. 77-92;
Matas, supra, note 11, pp. 399-401. For a discussion of the right of self-determination as
grounding a right of secession see infra.
17. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke,[1969] A.C. 645.
18. Cf P. Hogg, ConstitudonalLawof Canada,2nd ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), p. 104.
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law of the parent State, it is (as already stated) by no means inconceivable
that a given constitutional order, and particularly a federal constitutional
order, will concede an explicit or implied right of unilateral secession.19
Thus, before stigmatizing such a secession as illegal in this domestic sense,
one must consider vary carefully the constitutional norms in question. In
the case of a federal state, where the issue of secession will in all
probability go to the very root of its constitutional structure, such a
consideration will need to be more broadly cast than a narrowly legalistic
construction of the bare words of the constitutional text. Here, it should
be remembered that the trump card of the Northern States in America's
famous conflict over secession was artillery, not logic, 20 and that there is
nothing in the nature of federalism as such which is inherently
inconsistent with a right of unilateral secession.
Drawing all this together, and applying it to the specific case of an
attempt by Quebec to secede from Canada, it is clear that before a
determination could be made as to the domestic legality of such action,
a careful examination would first need to be made of Canada's own
constitutional structure and precepts. The object of this examination
would be to determine whether a 'legal secession' were possible, either
through utilization of an amendment process - resort to which would
admittedly be unlikely, in view of the Federal and Provincial cooperation that would most probably be required 2' - or by way of
unilateral declaration. As has already been suggested, in assessing this
domestic lawfulness of a unilateral secession, more will be required than
a narrow, legalistic analysis of the terms of the Canadian Constitution. In
times when the old sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament has had to be
discarded as so much constitutional myth, the basis of the Canadian
federation and its constitution, and the place of so fundamental an issue
as Provincial secession within them, will require a more sophisticated
treatment than mere textual elaboration. 2- Such questions are returned to
later in this article.23
19. K. Wheare, FederalGovernent, 4th ed. (London: Oxford Un. Press, 1963), pp. 86-7.
20. The victory of the North has tended to be interpreted as a crushing legal blow against
unilateral secession in federal states. In fact, the arguments of the secessionists as a matter of
law (rathir than of morality) were probably superior see Secession, pp. 67-8; J. Bryce, The
American Commonwealth, 2nd ed. (New York. Macmillan, 1891), I, pp. 409-10.
21. This is on the assumption that the relevant amendment would require at least the consent
of both Houses of the federal Parliament, and two-thirds of the Provinces comprising fifty per
cent of the Canadian people under section 38 of the ConstitutionAct 1982: see P. Hogg, supra,
note 18, pp. 102-3. The matter is further considered infra.
22. Although a more or less rigid textual analysis has hitherto been common: see eg., Hogg,
supra, note 18, pp. 101-2; D. Matas, supra, note 11; R. Mayer, "Legal Aspects of Secession
(1968-69), 3 Man. L J. No. 1, 61; J. Claydon and J. Whyte, "Legal Aspects of Quebee's
Claim for Independence" in R. Simeon, ed., Must Canadafail? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1977), p. 2 59 .
23. See infra,p.258.
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To return to a discussion of secession generally, it is in one sense even
possible to conceive of a 'partial secession', again particularly in relation
to a federal state. Under the simplest version of such a scenario, a region
would simply declare itself to be beyond the reach of this or that aspect
of the jurisdiction of the parent state. 24 This could involve, at its broadest,
a denial of competence over whole areas of action (such as criminal law
or immigration) or could operate more narrowly through the assertion of
a right of self-exemption from particular laws. Either way, the unit in
question could reasonably be said to have partially seceded (i.e.
withdrawn) from its parent legal system. Perhaps the best example of this
sort of reasoning is to be found in America's pre-Civil War doctrine of
nullification, which in propounding the right of a State to 'nullify'
unacceptable laws had the practical effect that the State concerned was
within the Union for some purposes, but not for others.2 5 The
sovereignty-association once proposed between Quebec and Canada by
the Parti Quebecois could, on one view, be seen as a rather extreme
variation upon this same theme. 26 A 'secession' of this type will be
attractive to a unit which wishes to continue to adhere to its original
status for some purposes, but not for others. Thus, in the hypothetical
case of a polity like Quebec, there might well be attractions in staying
within the original state structures for some purposes, but in being free to
pursue an independent course of policy where those structures proved
unduly restrictive. It need hardly be said that this type of reasoning does
not recommend itself to parent states, and that it would be difficult to
imagine such a partial secession which did not mature over time into a
fuller withdrawal.
It is appropriate at this point to note that while the natural outcome of
secession ordinarily will be the creation of a new nation state, recognized
as such by the international community,2 7 this question of international
recognition is logically distinct from issues pertaining to the right of a
territory to secede. It arises only once the process of secession is complete,
and does not directly bear upon the legal legitimacy of secessionist action
in a domestic or even in an international sense, although recognition or
non-recognition may well have practical consequences. Moreover, it does
not even follow that a seceding territory will seek admission to the
24. Of course, a partial secession might also be achieved by amendment.
25. See W. Bennett American Theories of Federalism (Alabama: Un. of Alabama Press,
1964), p. 143-7.
26. For an account of the issues involved in sovereignty association see C. Pentland,
'Association after Sovereignty?' in Simeon, supra,note 22, p. 223.
27. For example, the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, and the secession of Syria from
the United Arab Republic.
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community of nations: it may content itself merely with having thrown
off the yoke of its perceived oppressor.28 In any event, this piece is
concerned primarily with the internal ramifications of secession, rather
than its inter-play with principles concerning the international
recognition of new states.
One of the most important questions concerning secession movements
relates to the issue of why they arise.29 The short answer is that such
movements are almost infinitely various, and that their causes are
correspondingly disparate. This said, however, it is in fact possible to
divide secession movements into two broad categories on the basis of the
factors prompting secessionist feeling in each particular case. The
distinction thus produced is between secession movements which are
'ethnic' and those which are 'regional' in character.
The term 'ethnic secession movement' is in many ways inadequate to
describe the phenomenon to which it relates, but it is the best available.30
Such a secession movement occurs where a group claims essentially that
it is a distinct ethnic society within a state, possessed of insufficient ties of
common culture and interest to justify continued membership of that
state. 'Ethnicity' in this context may be understood as comprising a broad
compendium of racial, cultural, social, linguistic, religious and other
characteristics. Consequently, the group concerned wishes to withdraw in
order to pursue its individuality unfettered by membership of a broader
political community. As the name makes clear, the mainspring of such a
movement will be a feeling of ethnic difference. It is precisely this sort of
feeling which largely underlies the principle of self-determination of
peoples, and the basic claim of the ethnic secessionist is to a great extent
that what is involved is the realization of the wishes of a distinct 'people'.
Of course, economic considerations will frequently also be involved, and
it would probably be impossible to discover a 'pure' ethnic secession
movement. Nevertheless, in such a movement, a feeling of ethnic
difference in the broadest sense will lie at the heart of the desire for an
independent polity.31
There are many obvious examples of successful, unsuccessful and not
yet successful ethnic secession movements. Those currently under way in
both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are classic examples of ethnic
minorities struggling to achieve the creation of individual polities through

28. Buchheit, supra, note 6, pp. 230-5.
29. For a good general discussion of this and related issues see R. Watts, "Survival and
Disintegration" in Simeon, supra note 3, p. 43.
30. An alternative might be 'societal secession movements'.
31. See Watts, supra note 3, pp. 43-8.
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secession. Of course, subsidiary non-ethnic political and economic
elements are also present. The attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria
was fuelled largely by ethnic considerations, as is the little known attempt
of the Nagas to withdraw from India.3 2 Even the successful secession of
Bangladesh from Pakistan essentially involved the separation of two
ethnically disparate groups.33 The list could be multiplied without effort.
Regional secession movements do not proceed on the basis that what
is involved is the withdrawal of a distinct ethnic group from a wider
polity. There is no real suggestion that a separate 'people' is involved. All
in all, the typically less passionate claim is made that while the territory
in question does not constitute a distinct society, it possesses interests and
needs, and faces problems sufficiently different from those of the
remainder of the parent state, that they may best be dealt with as an
independent policy. The claim is less one of national fulfilment than of
self-management. Regional secession movements typically have a strong
economic flavour, and are replete with allegations that the central
government favours other territories over that which seeks to secede, and
that the territory concerned is economically exploited by the remainder
34
of the nation.
An excellent example of a regional secession movement is the attempt
of Western Australia to secede during the 1930s.3 5 The claim was not that
Western Australians were distinctively different from other Australians
(which would have been highly implausible) but rather that the more
populous and industrialized eastern states were exploiting a primaryproducing Western Australia as a source of cheap raw materials and as
a dumping ground for heavily protected second-class eastern goods
(which was entirely accurate).3 6 The interests of west and east were said
to be incompatible, and so a parting of the ways was proposed. There are,
in fact, striking resemblances between Western Australian secessionism
37
and the occasional outbursts of secessionist feeling in western Canada,
which is similarly regional in character.
It is, of course, perfectly possible to have a hybrid movement which is
difficult to classify. The attempt of Katanga to secede from the Congo
had a tribal (and hence an ethnic element) but was also heavily fuelled
by considerations as to the relative wealth of Katanga when compared
32. Buchheit, supra, note 6, pp. 189-98.
33. Ibid, pp. 198-201; Watts supra,note 3, pp. 43-4.
34. See Watts supra, note 3, pp. 46-7.
35. See supra,note 3.
36. Secession, pp. 43-6.
37. See ag. R. Burns, "British Columbia in Canada: Perceptions of a Split Personality" in
Simeon, supra, note 22, pp. 63, 65,70-1.
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with the remainder of the country.38 Secession in Bougainville might be
said to have a similarly ethno-economic character. The almost
paradigmatic Southern secessionist movement in the United States is
itself problematic, in the sense that while it is most properly characterized
as a regional movement turning mainly upon the vastly differing
economies of North and South, there was a dimension of societal
difference between the two protagonists which is difficult to dismiss as
merely 'regional'. However, such interesting questions cannot be pursued
here. Suffice to say that secession movements are generally ethnic or
regional in character, according to which factors are primarily
responsible for their occurrence, and that it is possible in a given case for
a movement to display characteristics of both types in different degrees.
As a general observation, ethnic secession movements are likely to be
the most dangerous to their host states. Founded as they are in deep
feelings of separate identity, often strengthened by linguistic and religious
factors, and fuelled by a 'peoples'-based rhetoric, such movements are
perfectly capable of enduring long periods of adversity, only to break out
with renewed vigour when circumstances are more propitious. It is
perhaps the most basic characteristic of such secession movements that,
like the ethnic feeling upon which they are based, they do not readily 'go
away'. So much is obvious to any person who has -watched in perplexity
as the apparently cohesive Soviet Union has resolved itself into a
collection of mutually mistrustful republics, among whom the intensity of
secessionist feeling does not seem to be greatly affected by the length of
Russian domination. Of course, Irish determination to separate from the
British Empire has continued for seven hundred years, while the Kurds
have been seeking to found their own state for millennia. Of all the tactics
for dealing with an ethnic secession movement, therefore, a reliance upon
its natural dissipation isperhaps the least likely to meet with success.
Regional movements will tend to be rather less rooted in the psyche of
the populations concerned, and to this extent, are less threatening to the
integrity of existing states. As has been noted, such movements are often
driven by economic considerations, and to this extent tend to wax and
wane according to economic circumstances: if the territory in question is
enjoying prosperous times, all is well; if not, the allegedly unresponsive
national government bears the blame, and secessionist feeling is renewed.
Thus, the Great Depression was a major catalyst in the Western
Australian secession movement. 39 This said, the process will occasionally
work in reverse, so that a territory which is enjoying particularly
38. Buchheit, supra note 6, pp. 162-4.
39. Secession, pp. 43-4.
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prosperous times may wish to rid itself of what it sees as indigent fellow
citizens. A strong element of this was present in the case of Katanga 0,
and also plays its part in sporadic proposals for a separate state in
Western Canada. 41 The most important point remains, however, that
such movements are generally more transitory than their ethnic
counterparts. Of course, this should not be over-stressed. Economics is a
profoundly powerful motivator, capable of stirring strong emotions and
resentments, and the fact that regional secession movements may come
and go will be no consolation to a state which has in fact lost part of its
territory through an appropriate conjunction of circumstances. Here, it
should be recalled that at the heart of the American Civil War lay a
largely economically driven regional secession movement.
Whatever other features it may exhibit, it is clear enough that the case
of Quebec falls squarely within the general category of ethnic secession
movements. Overwhelmingly the most important factor prompting a
withdrawal of Quebec from Canada is a feeling among the Quebecois
that they are a different 'people' from English Canadians. The fact that
the delineation of the relevant 'peoples' depends heavily upon linguistic
factors does not act to diminish this feeling of difference, which is
reinforced by religious and cultural factors, as well as an by undeniable
history of oppression. As Brossard puts it, '... la nation canadiennefrangaise constitue un "peuple" au sens le plus plein du terme.. .. 42 This
is not to say that there are not other elements in Quebec's grievance
against Canada, and the rhetoric of provincial rights may also be
discerned alongside that based on notions of a separate people. 43
Nevertheless, it is entirely apparent that any movement for the secession
of Quebec is properly described as an 'ethnic secession movement' in the
sense that the term is used here. It follows from the preceding analysis of
such movements, both that the secessionist impulse in Quebec belongs to
that class of secession movement which has historically been the most
troubling, and that the feeling upon which that impulse is based is
unlikely to simply dissipate over time. Neither of these conclusions can be
particularly surprising.
Before concluding this description of the broad phenomenon of
secession, an obvious but important point should be made as to its
general basis, and the implications of that point briefly considered.
40. See supra, note 38.
41. Cf Bums, supra,note 37, pp. 64-6; and see generally D. Kilgour, Uneasy Patriots Western
Canadimsin Federation(Edmonton: Lone Pine, 1988).
42. Brossard, supra,note 9, p. 181; and see generally pp. 161-85; J. Y. Morin, "Le fedealisme
canadien apres cent ans" (1967-68), 2 Rev. Jur.Them. 13.
43. See e-g. Brossard, supra,note 9, pp. 204-26; Morin, supra, note 42, pp. 21-2.
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Ultimately, a desire for secession is based upon a particular strand of
human feeling, namely, an affection for the like over the unlike, a
preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar, an identification which
the smaller and more local over the larger and more generalized. 44 In
short, secessionist feeling is ultimately based on the tendency of humans
to identify with and feel loyalty to, primarily if not exclusively, the social,
political, cultural and even geographical construct of which they most
immediately form part. Many things, other than secession' draw heavily
on the same idea: a notable example is federalism itself, with its concern
to preserve local decision-making capacity and self-government,
conformably (of course) with wider national interests. 45
The point made here is that it is thus quite wrong to dismiss the feeling
upon which secession movements are based - and hence such
movements themselves - as intrinsically 'stupid', 'foolish', 'backward' or
'unenlightened', as is so often done by protagonists of nation states
threatened with territorial disruption. There is nothing inherently
unintelligent, let alone unnatural, in the idea that one's life would be
happier in a polity more intimately connected with one's own and one's
neighbours' hopes, values and priorities. Of course, particular secession
movements may be both mad and bad, but so are some nation states. It
is largely our own 'nation-centricity', 46 itself a comparatively recent
phenomenon, that tends to make us automatically regard secession in so
negative a light.
Indeed, if one wishes to talk of 'unnaturalness', it is the concept of the
nation state which will often have more of a case to answer than either
local feeling or secession. Only too often, that state is an essentially
artificial abstraction, far removed from the experience and values of the
different groupings which go to make it up. Even when a state does exert
a hold on the minds of its people, their identification with it may be less
profound than their identification of it with them, and theirs. Thus, a
British Columbian may well love Canada, but when thinking of Canada
picture Vancouver and the mountains, just as a Canada-loving Nova
Scotian will love the Canada of Halifax and the Atlantic. It is when this
localized vision of the nation becomes inconsistent with the actions of the
nation state as such that trouble will occur. The basic point, however, is
that secession is neither necessarily illogical, nor inherently regressive. It
44. See Buchheit, supra, note 6, pp. 9 -11 .
45. See ag. B. Galligan and C. Walsh, "Australian Federalism: Yes or No' in G. Craven, ed.,
Australian Federalism - Towards the Second Century (forthcoming, Melbourne University
Press).
46. See generally Morin, J.-Y., "Liberte nationale et federalisme" (1964), 49 Rev. Jur.Them.
90.
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should be noted here that many respected nation states have at one point
or other withdrawn from larger political entities: the United States of
America, Norway and Ireland, to name but three. Thus, in the specific
context of Quebec, it should be remembered and remembered firmly that
when a Quebecois says that Quebec should leave Canada, that person
does not automatically stand condemned as a monster or a fool. They
may be wrong, but the matter is one for serious and considered argument.
As a final point, it may be objected that much has been made here of
the present prevalence of secession as an international phenomenon, but
nothing said of the great movements towards increasing integration
currently underway. Here, one might point not only to the inexorable
movement of the European Economic Community towards a state of
'quasi-federalism', but also to the re-unification of the two Germanies,
and the real possibility that at least some of the previously communist
states of eastern Europe will find their destinies together within a form of
federal union. The importance of all this being acknowledged, however,
its exact relationship with such broader issues as 'regionalism' and
'localism', and the possibility of secession based thereon, is more
problematic.
It may be that as nation states increasingly become part of supranational entities, and as those entities become increasingly significant in
the lives of persons living within their boundaries, regionalism will
increase, rather than decrease. What is meant here is that in a threecornered contest for the loyalty and identification of citizens between the
super-nation, the nation and the region, the nation - as an entity neither
of the grass-roots nor of the mountain tops - may well lose out. In this
sense, it may be more important to a person to be a Breton and a
European than Breton and French, or to be an East European and a
Croatian than an Yugoslav and a Croat. It may be observed in this
connection that expecting people to juggle three equal sets of communal
loyalties might be expecting too much. Moreover, as super-nations move
to consolidate their existence at the expense of national independence, it
may suit their interests to favour a diversity of regions and localities over
cohesive nation states, especially where a history of animosity exists
between the two. Thus, what we could see gradually emerging would be
necessarily looser super-national structures which are more tolerant of
regional feeling than the traditional nation state. Of course, the ultimate
direction of regional feeling within such a structure, and the ability of that
structure to accomodate it free of movements for secession, remains to be
seen. 47
47. See generally, T. Fleiner, "Federalism in Australia and Other Nations" in Craven, ed.,
supra note 45.
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I. Secession andFederalism
Passing to a consideration of secession specifically in the context of
federal states, the most often debated issue is whether federalism - as an
allegedly inherently 'weak' form of government - promotes secession.
This is an ancient charge, and was vigorously prosecuted by that
champion of unitary systems, Albert Dicey.48 In more recent times,
federalism has been similarly condemned on the basis of its admittedly
undistinguished record as a stable form of government among emergent
nations, particularly in Africa. 49 The allegation that federalism fosters
secession is thus both long-standing and current, and is only likely to be
put with increased intensity in light of recent world events.
It must be admitted that as a simple matter of statistics, the picture for
an ardent supporter of federalism is not an encouraging one. Put bluntly,
virtually every federal state of any standing has had sooner or later to face
a concerted bid for secession by one or more of its component regions.50
Such is true, for example, of the United States, Canada, Australia, and the
Soviet Union. Even the federations of antiquity had similarly antique
secession movements.5 1 Against this, however, must be set the undeniable
fact that not only federal states are plagued with secession: separatist
attempts by the territories of unitary states are also by no means
uncommon, with Bangladesh and Katanga being relevant examples.
Moreover, it is difficult to blame federalism for the current troubles of the
Soviet Union, when that state was until recently widely dismissed as
being federal in name only.5 2 All this said, however, and conceding that
the matter does not lend itself to strict statistical analysis, one is still left
with the impression that secession is more prevalent in federal, than in
unitary states.
This, of course, does not of itself conclude the case against federalism.
One is faced here with a 'chicken and egg' situation: does secession occur
in-federal states because there is something inherent in federalism which
leaves its host state exposed to secessionist feeling; or is a federal rather
than a unitary form of government adopted in the first place as a
recognition of pre-existing and divergent local interests which would not
bear a more centralized rule? If the latter is the case, it will be unfair to
blame federalism as such for outbreaks of secessionist feeling, unless of
course it could be shown that federalism acts to foster and inflame that
48. A. Dicey, The Law ofthe Constitution, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1926), p. lxxv.
49. See ag. T. Franck and others, Why FederationsFail-an inquiry into the requisitesfor
successfulFederalism(New York. New York University Press, 1968), p. 40 .
50. Secession, pp. 4-7.
51. Abidh
52. G. Sawer, Modem Federalism(London: Watts, 1969), p. 59.
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feeling. The question is, in a sense, whether federalism causes
secessionism, or secessionism causes federalism?
It would appear that, at least to a significant extent, the latter is true.
Federalism is likely to be chosen as a form of government where ethnic
or other divisions are such as to make closer union impossible. For
example, neither the French Canadians, nor the Biafrans, nor indeed the
populations of the American and the Australian states, would have lightly
accepted complete merger in a wider political community. The feelings of
difference - whether based on ethnicity or interest - which were later
to prompt secession movements within these federations were already
present at the inception of federalism, and underlay its choice over a
unitary system of government. It hardly seems fair to blame federalism
too rigorously for a failure to root out difficulties which underlie its own
adoption. One gains a strong impression that, at least in the case of
deeply-seated ethnic secession movements, such impulses would have
continued regardless of the form of government adopted. So much is
readily observable in the case of the Soviet Union, and is probably true
also of situations like that which arose in Biafra, and quite possibly in the
case of French Canada as well.
Nevertheless, the damage to the reputation of federalism having thus
been minimized, it must be acknowledged that some facets of federalism
will have the potential to assist, if not actually to create, secessionist
movements. One's impression is that this effect will be more pronounced
in the case of regional than ethnic secession movements, which - being
typically less profound - are more in need of support to ensure their
continued vitality. Three factors may be mentioned.
First, the dual government implicit in federalism, centred as it is
around a concept of 'division', has the potential to embody and continue
an existing separation between territories which might otherwise have
faded over time.53 Part of this will involve the existence of an independent
state structure capable of competing with the national government for the
political loyalty of the citizens of a territory. Any such effect will
ordinarily be less critical where deep-seated ethnic feeling exists, which
feeling will probably continue without the need for such artificial stimuli
as regional borders or legislatures, though this is not to say that such
stimuli will not be of assistance. However, in the case of mere regional
feeling, the constitutional division involved in federalism is more likely to
be a necessary condition for the survival of that feeling. It would, for
example, be difficult to imagine secession as even a theoretical possibility

53. Secession, pp. 7-8.
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in a country like Australia were not the old colonial borders perpetuated
in the form of states boundaries within the Australian federation.
Secondly, federalism will posit the existence of a regional.
governmental structure, which will be able to act as a collator and
articulator of regional grievances against the central government. Such
grievances will naturally be channelled towards and through the regional
government, providing not only the opportunity for the reinforcement of
those grievances through articulation and dissemination, but also
promoting the identification of the citizens of a region with their natural
champion, the regional government.m Moreover, that government will be
only too glad to try and deflect blame for adverse conditions from itself
onto the central authorities. In these circumstances, secessionist
tendencies may well be inflamed. Again, the effect is perhaps greatest in
the case of regional movements, but even an ethnically based secession
movement will obviously benefit from the capture of a state apparatus
capable of advancing its cause and articulating its claims. One need only
to turn to the ferocious attacks launched by the governments of the States
upon the Government of the Union during the Civil War to appreciate
the potential of regional governments in this connection.
Finally, in the event that a secession movement comes to fruition, a
regional governmental structure will provide that movement with an
existing state apparatus, capable of directing the struggle (if struggle there
be) for independence, and of taking up the reins of government
thereafter 55 Thus, there will not be the harrowing necessity of trying to
create a state 'from the ground up' that will commonly face a secession
movement which is not based upon a constituent region of a federal state.
This incalculable organizational boon bestowed by federalism upon
secession movements is perhaps the factor which operates most equally as
between ethnic and regional secession movements. Again, its operation is
perhaps most clearly seen in the American Civil War, but may be
discerned in virtually all federal secession movements.
How, then, has federalism operated upon secessionist tendencies in
Quebec? To the extent that a movement for the withdrawal of Quebec
from the Canadian federation comprises an ethnic secession movement of
considerable profundity, it must first be observed that it is quite
implausible that such impulses would simply have disappeared had
Canada only possessed the wisdom to become a unitary state. Indeed,
against any sins to be laid at the door of federalism must be set the wellknown (though admittedly early) view of Trudeau, that the compara54. b d
55. Did
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tively decentralized character of Canadian federalism had in reality acted
as a safety-valve on French-Canadian nationalism, and that the result of
any attempt to impose a more unified form of government would have
56
been to convert Quebec's secession from a threat into a reality.
However, it would be vain to deny that secessionist feeling in Quebec
has, to a significant extent, fed off Canadian federalism. While such
feeling would doubtless easily havesurvived unification, it has especially in recent times - taken full advantage of the Provincial state
apparatus. The governmental structures of Quebec have become the
means by which the cause of French Canada is to be advanced, and its
government is likewise the outspoken champion of that cause. The
existence of the provincial government of Quebec has provided the
essentially ethnic movement for that Province's secession not only with a
platform, but with an immediate focus for its plans and aspirations.
Moreover, French-Canadian separatism has been able to diversify its
demands and grievances by tapping into a rich stream of Provincial rights
reasoning and rhetoric, 5 7 Were Quebec to secede tomorrow, it would be
able to function independently in almost every particular as a fullyequipped state structure. Thus, while Trudeau was almost certainly
correct in saying that Canadian federalism has played a major role in
keeping Quebec at home as part of Canada, it is probably equally (if
paradoxically) true that should Quebec leave, federalism will also have
provided part of her fare.
Quite apart from an assessment of these very practical means by which
federalism may foster secession, one might also be tempted to consider
the impact of what could loosely be termed the psychology - or perhaps
more accurately the psychosis - of federalism itself. This is a nebulous
but important point which is difficult to make with any degree of
precision. Put simply, a federal system of government is one which
necessarily has an enormous conceptual question hanging over its head.
It is not, like a unitary state, an intrinsic whole. Rather, it is a composite
entity, made up of different units. Even the laziest political thinker, when
faced with such a structure, must eventually ponder the obvious question:
'Those units are in, but can they get out?' The possible disintegration of
a unified whole is not a thought that readily occurs:, the permanence of
bonds between obviously separate entities is a natural subject of
speculation. Thus, federalism of its very nature begs the question of
secession in much the same way that marriage raises the issue of
56. P. E. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada,
1968), p. 198.
57. See supra,note 43.
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divorce,58 and this question will be particularly acute where a federation
is composed of previously sovereign or quasi-sovereign polities who
freely consented to combine into the federation in question.59 In such

circumstances the federalism-secession marriage-divorce analogy is
compelling, and the entire federal structure and all concerned with it
must to some extent absorb this uncertainty as to its enduring nature.
This basic constitutional insecurity in a federal state may manifest itself
in diverse forms. Only two are concentrated upon here, chosen partly
because they are familiar from experience with Australia's federal system,
and partly because elements of them are discernible in Canada's own
situation. The first, is that many within a federation will be desperately
inclined to down-play all suggestions of regional difference and character.
Given the manifest conceptual danger of federal disintegration, it is
apparently considered safest to comprehensively deny as an article of
faith that any feeling which might conceivably be sympathetic to a
secession movement could reasonably exist.60 The cry here is that 'All
Canadians / Australians / Americans are the same, and should be treated
the same'. 6' Anyone who suggests that this rather sweeping conclusion
might be overstated, or reveals some degree of regional loyalty or
affection, is branded as a crank, or worse. This tendency is more marked
in Australia than in Canada, where regional feeling is stronger, and
therefore more respectable, and where at least some degree of difference
between French and English Canadians is self-evident, but its influence
may be discerned nonetheless, particularly on the part of the moredetermined advocates of expanded Federal power, and among those
most opposed to the aspirations of Quebec. 62
The second, and much more localized phenomenon, concerns the
writings of legal commentators. Were one to rely solely upon such
writings, it is often the case that one would scarcely know in respect of
a given federal state that secession was an issue of even theoretical
importance, let alone that such a movement might have arisen in the past
and posed a serious threat to national integrity, or that such tendencies
continue to subsist. Rather, there is a profound tendency to ignore
secession as something distastefully insignificant, or if that is simply not
58. Secession, pp. 7-8.

59. Ibd, pp. 73-4.

60. Cf G. Craven, "A Few Fragments of State Constitutional Law", forthcoming in (1990)
20 Universi, of Western AustraliaLawReview.
61. See e-g. R. Hawke, The Resolution of Conflict (1979), pp. 18-19.
62. See e-g. E. Forsey, 'Can Canada get by without Quebec? Absolutely', Globe andMai
September 20-21, 1990. See also as an extreme example the following remarkable publication:
V. Forster, Conningthe Canadians(1990).
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possible, to give it as scanty a treatment as can decently be managed. The
whole process seems to be one of simple denial. This tendency may be
noticed in Australia, where legal writers (and historians) have valiantly
attempted to expunge a very serious secession movement from our
constitutional history 6 3 but is just as pronounced in a Canada beset by a
secession movement of the utmost seriousness. At a time when legal
discussion of secession could not be more timely, interest appears to be
desultory, at least among English Canadian legal academics. The same
has been true of.earlier crises.6 Thus, collections of writings relating to
the failure of Meech Lake will cover in detail every imaginable issue,
except the fundamental question of what happens if, as a consequence,
Quebec decides to leave the federation.6 5 It is a phenomenon familiar to
anyone who has studied the legalities of secession in Australia, but one
none the less remarkable for that.
IV. The Courseof Secession Movements in FederalStates
What is attempted here is a necessarily brief description of a few features
typical of the course of secession movements within federal states.
Perhaps the very first point which should be made is that once a
constituent region has actually determined upon secession (as opposed to
having merely issued ritual threats), it will usually be extremely difficult
to persuade it back from the brink. Regardless of the deeper
considerations upon which a secession is based, such a course will only
be adopted when the citizens of the region concerned cease to have even
the modest degree of emotional involvement with the wider state that is
necessary to render a federal union supportable. A region may well
endure a great deal before this point is reached, when not only have
affection and loyalty ceased (if they ever existed), but even passionate
anger has tended to give way to steady resentment and settled
indifference. Even at a late stage there may be the possibility of
rapprochement through accommodation. Once, however, a region has
66
emotionally withdrawn (or as Morin puts it, 'psychologically retired')
from its federation, the task of winning it back is - short of the use of
force - prodigious. Obviously enough, the preferable time to defuse a
secession movement is in fact before the resentment of the region in
63. Secession, pp. 55-60.
64. Hogg, writing before the present crisis, cites only two english articles on the subject, that
of Matas (supra,note 11) and Mayer (supra,note 22): Hogg, supra,note 18, pp. 101-2. There
is also the contribution of Claydon and White in Simeon, supra,note 22.
65. See eg. K. Swinton and C. Rogerson, Competing ConstitutionalVisionr The Meech Lake
Accord (Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
66. Morin, supra,note 42, p. 29.
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question is firmly channelled into secessionist feeling, or if that is
impossible, at least before that feeling and its logical outcome have
become inflexible 'givens' in regional politics.
Many illustrations might be given, both of this need for a prompt
response to any growth in secessionist feeling, and of the consequences of
ignoring or misinterpreting that need. The frantic last-minute attempts to
save the American Union, and their complete inutility in the face of
implacable and long-standing Southern hostility are well-known.67 To
take a less intractable dispute by way of example, one has only to look
to the case of Western Australia. Grievance and resentment had been
building in that State for almost 30 years before a serious course of
secession was embarked upon. Despite repeated and progressively more
savage warnings, the Commonwealth Government almost completely
ignored the gathering crisis. Only when secession was literally days away,
and even then with great ill-grace, was some acknowledgement made
that serious problems had arisen, and that some redress might be
necessary. By that time, it was too late: the arguments of the
Commonwealth were scarcely even heard, and a secession referendum
68
was passed by an overwhelming majority.
Indeed, the example of Western Australia illustrates not only the
extreme fragility of last-ditch stands to save federation, but also
something of a tendency on the part of central governments to adopt
precisely such a short-sighted approach in dealing with secessionist
impulses. This tendency is easy enough to explain: no federal government
will wish lightly to admit that its territory stands in imminent danger of
disintegration, and there will always be a real temptation to characterize
a serious problem as mere 'temporary disaffection'. This will, of course,
have the happy effect of obviating the need for decisive action.
Neither of these phenomena, however, can hold much joy for Canada.
Even on the basis of a slight acquaintanceship with this country's
constitutional history and politics, it is not difficult to discern a strong
tendency on the part of both the Federal authorities and much of Englishspeaking Canada generally to avoid taking the issue of secessionist feeling
in Quebec with anything like the degree of seriousness which it would
apparently warrant. Thus, as a matter of recent history, Quebec in 1980
came to the brink of secession, and was pulled back largely by lastminute propitiating promises and reassurances. 69 From the point of view
67. See eg. W. Cotton and B. Cotton, The Roads to Sumter (1963), especially chs. 5 and 6.

68. Secession, ch. 3.
69. See generally E. McWhinney, Canadaand the Constitution 1979-1982 (Toronto: Un. of
Toronto Press, 1982), ch. 3, 'The Quebec Referendum'.
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of the Quebecois, perhaps predictably, few of these promises came to
fruition, and Quebec was in fact dragged through the humiliation of the
1982 patriation of the Constitution and institution of the Charter without
its consent.70 Not surprisingly, this treatment only increased Quebec's
resentment. The wider Canadian response to this resentment was
comprised in the attempted Meech Lake agreement. However, the fiasco
involved in the failure of Meech Lake, replete as it was with accusations
and recriminations hurled against Quebec, can only have served to
resolve any doubts on the part of many Quebecois as to the feelings
harboured towards their Province by English Canada, and as to the
*coursewhich they now must follow.
The main consequence of all this is that Canada once again faces the
prospect of Quebec's secession, but does so with little apparent
realization of the seriousness of its situation, and with no particularly
discernible appreciation that - on the assumption the federation in its
present form is worth saving - resolute action is needed before it is too
late. Rather, the same old arguments over Meech Lake are endlessly
rehashed, 71 the same Provincial Premiers posture as the champions of
Canadian unity when their actions in fact constitute one of the main
threats to that unhappy species. 72 The population at large basks happily
in a lazy hostility towards Quebec. The appreciation that the preliminary
skirmishes are over, and that Canada faces a major threat to her national,
institutional and territorialintegrity, is as slow reaching Ottawa and
Winnipeg as the corresponding awareness ever was in reaching Canberra
and Melbourne in 1930. If Quebec secedes, then no matter how often the
prospect has been derisorily (and even approvingly) discussed by English
Canada in the past, the most common reaction will undoubtedly be one
of considerable surprise, and in these circumstances, the chance that
timely and thoughtful steps will be taken to defuse the situation is not
high. Indeed, one of the more interesting if depressing questions
concerning the possibility of Quebec's secession is whether or not it is
already to late for it to be avoided.
A second general point of great importance is that secession can be a
catching disease within a federal state: there is always the real danger that
if one constituent region secedes, it will be followed by others. The
pattern here seems to be that once the integrity of a federation is
compromised by an initial secession, some psychological barrier is down,
and that state's ability to retain its other regions is seriously diminished.
70. See P. Hogg, Meech Lake ConstitutionalAccordannotated(Toronto: Carswell, 1988), pp.
2-4.
71. See ag. Swinton and Rogerson, supra,note 65.
72. See eg. the statements of the premier of Newfoundland to the effect that the proponents
of Meech Lake should never be forgiven: Globe andMail 9 September, 1990.
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This is not to say that an individual secession will inevitably be followed
by the wholesale disintegration of the federal state concerned, but the
potential for further departures is there, and its existence is not hard to
explain. A successful secession will not only fracture the constitutional
integrity of the federal state, but will aim a humiliating blow at the
prestige of the federal government, as well as furnishing an open
invitation to any other dissatisfied unit to follow suit. It is thus no wonder
that multiple secessions can occur, or that the hostility of federal
authorities towards an attempted secession may be sharply accentuated
by a species of regional 'domino theory'.
Again, the secession crisis in the United States is a case in point. Once
the irrevocable step of secession had actually been taken by South
Carolina, and the psychological barrier crossed, the Union had received
a major blow, upon which the secession of the other rebel states followed
comparatively quickly. 73 So much had been feared from the outset.

Exactly the same fear lay behind the Commonwealth of Australia's
frenzied reaction to Western Australia's bid to secede, a reaction which
(as we have seen) came only after secession was inevitable. The
Commonwealth was frankly terrified that Western Australia would take
with it at least the states of South Australia and Tasmania, and there was
every reason to suppose this could be the case. Both States were watching
the course of the attempt with great interest, and had made it clear that
they regarded Western Australia's attempt as a test case. 74
The particular dynamics of the secession of Quebec are, of course, very
different, but it is not difficult to see how such action could conceivably
trigger some wider disintegration of the Canadian Federation. To take
one scenario only, the departure of Quebec would leave Western Canada
stranded in a Federation subject to the almost complete political
domination of the much-disliked Ontario. In such circumstances, and on
the assumption that Quebec's own secession had been accomplished with
a minimum of dislocation, Western Canada might well be tempted to
likewise strike out on its own.75 What would happen to the rump of
Canada then would be anyone's guess, but it would at least be clear that
the Atlantic Provinces, most probably separated from Ontario by
Quebec, and reliant upon payments which Ottawa surely could no longer
make, could not survive in their present form. One (grimly hilarious)
possibility would be union with Quebec. Indeed, it must be conceded
that the position of the Maritimes will be problematic enough if Quebec

73. See eg. H. Agar, The Price of Union, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966),
pp. 403-5.
74. Secession, pp. 56-7.
75. Cf Bums, supra, note 37, p. 71.
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alone leaves Canada. 76 It is hardly suggested that this scenario represents
the inevitable consequence of the secession of Quebec, but it is far from
being totally implausible. This 'disintegration factor' is something which
might be kept in mind by Canadians when considering their attitude
towards the possibility of Quebec seceding, and in determining the degree
of effort which they are prepared to make in order to avoid that
eventuality. While it may or may not be true that Quebec as such would
be 'no loss to Canada', the real equation is not nearly so simple.
One of the most obvious questions concerning the course of secession
movements in federal states is as to the most effective means by which a
constituent region may approach secession. Here, there will essentially be
a choice between a unilateral, and what might be termed a 'co-operative'
secession. In the latter situation, the seceding region will seek to act with
the consent of the central government, and possibly of other component
regions, usually via the mechanism of a constitutional amendment
procedure.
. On this question there can be little doubt. Any federal region
absolutely determined upon a course of secession will almost always be
well-advised to pursue its goal by unilateral action. There are a number
of reasons for this. First and foremost, a major factor militating against
co-operative secession is the simple one that a seceding region's federal
government is highly unlikely to be co-operative. The reasons underlying
this negative attitude towards secession are easy to isolate, and may be
expressed in the language of high constitutional principle 77 or realpolitik
according to taste. The basic truth, however, remains the same: the
governments of nation states generally do not lightly acquiesce in the
serious diminution of their territory. This reaction may vary in intensity
according to the importance attached to the particular territory, and there
undoubtedly have been instances of co-operative secession, 78 but the
reaction of federal states to the secession of a component region will
typically be extremely hostile. The reaction of the Union to the secession
crisis of the 1860s and of the Commonwealth of Australia to Western
Australia's pretensions are identical in this respect. Such hostility will
naturally be increased where there is any fear that further secessions may
79
be a logical consequence of the departure of the region in question.

76. See G. Rawlyk, 'Quebee's Separation and The Atlantic Provinces' in Simeon, supra,note
22, p. 85; R. Winter, 'Reflections on Meech Lake and Separatism', Atlantic Provinces
Economic Council, Newsletter, (June 1990), p. 3 .
77. See eg. Hogg, supra,note 18, p. 103.
78. Eg., that of Norway from Sweden.
79. See supr, p. 251.

Federalism, Secession, Canada and Quebec

Secondly, if a region seeks the permission of other authorities within its
federal structure to secede, normally on the basis that such permission is
a legal requirement, it runs the serious risk that, in the event that
permission is refused, secessionist action will be delegitimized in the eyes
of its own people, as well as the remainder of the federation. The effect
of this may well be to make the goal of secession immensely more
difficult to achieve, especially if there is significant opposition within the
region itself. This is perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from
Western Australia's bid for secession, where that State rested all its hopes
upon the favourable reception by the Imperial Parliament of a petition
for the amendment of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act.
The rejection of that request effectively stigmatized any attempt by
Western Australia to secede by other means as unconstitutional, and
fatally undermined further efforts in that direction.80 Of course, the more
determined a region is to secede, the less likely it is to be balked by such
considerations, but the significance of this sort of delegitimation in a
volatile political context should not be underestimated.
A third factor promoting unilateral over co-operative secession is that
it will fit better with any secession movement which is ultimately based
upon a notion of the inherent right of individual peoples to found their
own community.81 It will sit uneasily with such notions, and more
particularly with the political and rhetorical momentum based thereon,
for a seceding region to nevertheless go cap in hand to the federal and
other authorities seeking permission to leave. The logic of such secession
movements is inevitably biased towards unilateral action.
Finally, unilateral secession offers the incalculable tactical advantage
of placing an enormous burden of reaction upon the central government.
As long as a discontented region merely threatens secession, its central
government will usually prove more than able to match its efforts at
bluster. If the region seeks permission to secede, that can easily be denied.
But when a region actually does secede, an agonizing choice faces the
central authorities. What are they to do? Should they use force? Should
they resort to economic measures? Should they open negotiations? Any
step is fraught with difficulty, and likely to be the subject of conflicting
opinions. In such circumstances, a seceding region might reasonably hope
for, if not rely upon, at least an initial degree of paralysis on the part of
the central authorities, and possibly for long-term inaction. Such a hope
will be all the more reasonable if the federal state is a traditionally stable
and peaceful one, unused to the taking of stringent measures. The
80. Secession, p. 59.
81. Seesupra p. 238; and see infrta p.25 5.
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dithering response of the Union to the initial secession of the Southern
States, with the situation being rescued only at quite a late stage by the
82
efforts of those such as Lincoln, is an object lesson here.
Of course, none of this is to deny the real advantages of co-operative
secession where this is possible. Not only will such action ordinarily
accord with the domestic law of the federal state in question, but it will
clearly have the potential to produce a more amicable and considered
settlement than that which might follow upon a unilateral action.
However, given, in particular, the extreme unlikelihood of federal cooperation, and the adverse consequences which may attend the failure of
an attempted secession by co-operative means, a determinedly
secessionist region will usually find unilateral secession to be the more
practical course. Consequently, the temptation for such a region to secede
first and talk about it later will often be compelling. It should be
appreciated, of course, that a unilateral secession need not entirely
preclude negotiation. A region might be perfectly willing to discuss the
precise terms of its secession before the event, as opposed to seeking
permission for such action, and might subsequently care to enter into
detailed discussions consequent upon its secession with the state of which
it formerly was part, with a view to resolving outstanding constitutional,
political or economic difficulties. But these negotiations will be from a
position of strength, and in an atmosphere where the position of the
region cannot conceivably be misunderstood.
There is no obvious reason to suppose that these general propositions
would not hold good in the specific case of an attempt by Quebec to
secede from Canada. It can hardly be doubted that any Federal
Government would be implacably opposed to the secession of Quebec.8 3
To the extent that it is relevant, the opposition of the English-speaking
Provinces could also confidently be predicted. Some very limited
discussion of the domestic legalities of the secession of Quebec occurs
later in this article, but it may be noted at this point that the most obvious
means of a 'legal' secession would be via an amendment to the
Constitution of Canada, involving both Federal and Provincial
consents.8 4 Given the extreme unlikelihood that such consents would be
forthcoming; that their refusal, once sought, would potentially
compromise the legitimacy of secessionist action; that the position of a
Canadian government faced with an accomplished secession would be
excruciating; and that any claim by Quebec for withdrawal from Canada
82. See Agar, supra,note 73, pp. 405-13; 419-26.
83. See Hogg, supra, note 18, p. 103; Mayer, supra, note 22.
84. See infra,p. 258.
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would draw deeply upon an inherent right of peoples to found their own
polity: who could deny that unilateral action presents a highly attractive
option to anyone committed to Quebec's secession? The alternative of
protracted and probably futile negotiation must seem particularly
unpalatable in light of the failure of Meech Lake.
Thus, if Quebec ever determines upon secession, its most plausible
course would be to move calmly and deliberately towards the
achievement of that goal by unilateral act. Doubtless, the rest of Canada
would be informed of its intentions, and invited (as appropriate) to take
part in discussions as to how the course of secession could be followed
with the least dislocation to all concerned, and indeed, what the terms of
that secession might be. But these discussions would not in any sense be
in the nature of a request for permission to secede. Secession would go
ahead with or without some wider Canadian blessing, and if discussions
as to final terms were ineffective before it occurred, they might prove
more fruitful thereafter.
It is worth briefly mentioning one invariable facet of secession
movements in federal (and for that matter in non-federal states), and that
it is the development of a secessionist rhetoric. Secession movements will
typically produce a diverse oral and literary infra-structure aimed at
justifying secession to the population of the region concerned, the
federation at large and even the world in general. So much is clear
enough of the secession movements currently percolating within the
Soviet Union, and the secessionist literature produced by the Southern
States was both voluminous and sophisticated. 85 During the 1930s,
Western Australia went so far as to produce a long publication intended
for consumption both within and without Australia, entitled The Case of
the People of Western Australiafor Secession86 , which roundly blamed
successive Commonwealth governments for all the woes of the seceding
state. It is significant in this context that any movement for the secession
of Quebec already has a strong political-constitutional literature upon

87
which it may draw, including the work of such writers as Bourassa,

Morin,8 8 Valli~res 89 and Brossard.90
It is appropriate at this point to consider the significance of specifically
legal argument in attempts by regions of federal states to secede. We are
85. See e g. Calhoun, supra, note 13. .Taylor, New Views of the Constitution(1923).
86. An analysis of this document is undertaken in Secession pp. 36-46.
87. See generally E. McWhinney, Quebec and the Constitution 1960-1978 (Toronto: Un. of
Toronto Press, 1979), ch. 3, 'Quebec Constitutional Theory'.
88. See supra,note 42, note 46.
89. See eg. P. Vallires, Ngres blans d'Amdrique (Montreal: Editions Parti-Pris, 1968).
90. See supra,note 9.
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here primarily concerned with arguments as to the legality of unilateral
secession, both because there will ordinarily be little doubt that some
authority or combination of authorities would be able co-operatively to
effect a constitutional amendment permitting secession, and because'it
will be precisely such a constitutional amendment that it will be beyond
the power of the seceding region to secure.
The significance of legal argument in this context is often
misunderstood, usually in one of two ways. The first approach is to
regard law as virtually dispositive of the entire issue. Here, the tendency
is to triumphantly demonstrate that unilateral secession is consistent or
inconsistent (usually inconsistent) with the relevant constitutional
instrument, and then to assume that this concludes the matter. The
second approach is to assert that law really has no relevance whatsoever
in relation to unilateral secession, except to the extent that it is selfevidently true that a successful secession, as a completed revolution, will
create a new legal regime. The flavour here is that unilateral secession is
exclusively a matter of brutal political reality into which the niceties of
legal argument do not significantly intrude. Somewhat paradoxically,
these two approaches are often adopted sequentially by the same
commentators, so that after it is concluded that unilateral secession is
illegal as a matter of constitutional law, it is then conceded as a 'throw
away line' that a revolutionary secession will create its own legality.91
Both these approaches misconceive the real role of legal argument in
unilateral secession.
Legal argument will neither be dispositive of any issue of unilateral
secession, nor will it be practically irrelevant. Rather, its role is as a
crucial if highly specialized rhetorical and moral weapon on each side of
the debate, 92 but particularly in the hands of those favouring secession.
Secession movements in federal states will go to great lengths to produce
complex arguments justifying not only the political morality of secession,
but also its legality. It is not difficult to understand why. It will be of
enormous importance to a seceding region to be able to assert the legality
of its action, first, so as to reassure its own population as to the wider
legitimacy of that course, but secondly, so that any attempt by the central
authorities to hinder secession may be portrayed not only as wrong, but
as illegal according to the very norms of the constitutional structure that
those authorities are pledged to support. An ability to achieve victory, or
at least an honorable draw in this legal debate will be of great use to a
seceding region in the wider moral and political controversy surrounding
91. See ag. Hogg, supra,note 18; Matas, supra,note 11.
92. Cf Mayer, supra, note 22, p. 61.
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the legitimacy of its secession. It is as much for these reasons as upon any
strictly 'legal' considerations that writers like Calhoun and Taylor were at
such pains to justify the legality of southern secession, 93 and it is its
potential for use in such a debate that has helped make the principle of
self-determination such a bug-bear to existing nation states.94
In very general terms, two different lines of argument might be
resorted to by a component region of a federal state in order to legally
justify its unilateral secession. The first would be based upon propositions
said to flow from the legal nature of the federal union itself, and may be
referred to as 'the compact theory of federation' 95, although it has many
names, 96 and many variants. The essential idea, however, is clear enough:
the constitution of a federal union is a compact between the component
regions of that union. In the event of a breach of that compact, a region
is entitled to rescind the agreement, and to withdraw from the bargain that is, to secede. This is the kernel of the theories of writers such as
Calhoun. 97 It is clear, of course, that the exact applicability of such
reasoning will vary according to the history and circumstances of
particular federations. Notably, a compact analysis will be more
immediately applicable to a federation composed of pre-existing
sovereign communities which freely united, than to a federal union
whose regional entities owe their own existence to the act of union. 98 In
the latter situation, it is ordinarily much more difficult to speak of a
compact. 99
The second line of argument would look not to federalism for its
inspiration, but to international law, and even (to an extent) to natural
law. Such an argument would assert the inherent right of 'peoples' to
form their own polity, a legal right superior to any stipulations of a state's
own constitution. 100 Heavy reliance would be placed on Article 1 of the
United Nations Charter, with its reference to 'self-determination of
peoples'. The argument of the seceding region will thus be that its
population constitutes a distinct people, who are legally entitled to decide
upon their own form of government. This is in fact the argument of
secession movements in unitary states around the world, but it is equally
open to a federal region, assuming that there is an adequate degree of
93. Secession, pp. 63-74.
94. See Buchheit, supra,note 6, ch. 2.
95. See Secession,pp. 60-74.
96. Eg. the theory of 'State Sovereignty': Bennett, supra, note 25, p. 120.
97. Calhoun, supra,note 13, pp. 300-1.
98. See Supra
99. Secession, pp. 61-74.
100. See generally, Buchheit, supra,note 6, ch. 2, 'The Search for a Right to Secede'.
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identification between the 'people' in question and the territory of the
region. It is not the purpose of this article to touch upon a very vexed
question of whether the principle of self-determination can in fact give
domestic legal colour to a secession'movement 01, but it may be accepted
for present purposes that this is one of the broad lines of legal argument
open to a seceding region.
Consistently with the comments already made concerning the role of
legal argument in the present context, it is important to understand the
use to which the lines of argument identified above are to be put. These
are not necessarily arguments to be advanced in legalistic form before a
court of law, and certainly not before the courts of the parent state. If they
can be used successfully to convince such a court, well and good, but they
are primarily addressed to a far wider audience, namely, opinion within
the seceding region and the federal state, and even internationally. In this
sense, such arguments do not have the same need to proceed from a
rigorously juridical basis in the relevant federal constitution in the same
way as, say, a division of powers argument before the Supreme Court of
Canada. Rather, they will serve their purpose perfectly well if they can be
founded plausibly in some broad, fundamental vision of the federal polity
concerned, or of the rights of peoples generally.
It is interesting to consider the specific question of what legal
arguments might be put forward by Quebec to justify its unilateral
secession from Canada. The starting point here must be to note that it has
been universally assumed that such action would be inconsistent with the
British North America Act [now the ConstitutionAc4 1867],102 and thus
that secession would, from a legal point of view, necessitate a
constitutional amendment. 03 Brossard cites an impressive number of
provisions which would produce such an inconsistency,1°4 and one need
only consider sections 5 and 6, which between them legally create the
Province of Quebec as part of the Dominion of Canada, to conclude that
any explicitly textual basis for the unilateral secession of Quebec would
be impossibly weak. Indeed, given that these two provisions between
them reflect the constitutional fact that Quebec as a matter of strict law
became a province of Canada not as a result of its own action but by
101. bid; and see Mayer, supra note 22, pp. 66-70.
102. See eg. Hogg, supra,note 18, p. 102; Matas, supra, note 11, pp. 388-9; Mayer, supra,
note 22, p. 63.
103. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the question of whether, such an
amendment could be passed simply with the consent of both Houses of the Federal Parliament
and two-thirds of the Provincial legislatures representing at least 50% of the people of Canada
(section 38) or whether the unanimity procedure would be required (section 41). On such
questions see ag. Hogg, ii,4 pp. 102-3.
104. Brossard, supra,note 9, p. 262.
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virtue of the superior will of the Imperial Parliament, it might seriously
be wondered how an argument based on the compact theory of
federation, for example, could even be advanced.
The answer is that the type of reasoning advanced above is part of a
particular legal game that a Quebec determined upon secession would
not even have to play. It may be conceded that the bare words of the
ConstitutionAc4 1867 and the surface reality of its enactment by the now
defunct Imperial Parliament, give little comfort to secession. But Quebec
would be appealing not to the letter of the Canadian Constitution but to
its substance, not to its surface reality but to its underlying reality. Here,
it would be argued that whatever form the Confederation of 1867 may
have taken, it embodied a central political and factual reality of the
voluntary coming-together of two nations, one English-speaking, the
other French-speaking and centred on Quebec. It would be in this
fundamental and continuing duality that the true character of the
Canadian Constitution and the federalism based thereon would be said to
lie, and in an exercise of that duality that a right to secession would be
founded.105
As Calhoun himself might have put it, at the heart of Canadian
constitutional dispositions lies the reality of a compact between the
English and French nations. That compact goes deeper than any mere
term of the Constitution itself - such terms pre-suppose its existence and
continuation. This compact, having been repeatedly breached by English
Canada, is now terminable by French Canada in the form of the Province
of Quebec. Again, it must be stressed that this argument, while legal in
character, is not one that will ultimately stand or fall according to its
reception in a court of law - it's a wider theatre of operation. This said,
as a constitutional vision of the Canadian federation, it is at least as,
plausible as some myopic construction of the terms of the Constitution
Act 1867, as aided by a dogmatic adherence to the erstwhile sovereignty
of the Imperial Parliament. To this extent, the recognition by a court, and
especially by a Quebecois court, of a right of unilateral secession in
Quebec is not outside the bounds of possibility.
Put as it is above, it is easy to see how a legal argument raised by
Quebec on the basis of the compact theory of federation could be dovetailed with (and indeed, virtually shades into) one drawing upon the right
of a people to self-determination. Once more, the national duality of the
Canadian federation would be brought into play, with a view to claiming
that French-speaking Canadians, again centred on Quebec, constitute a
105. Cf Morin, 'Le federalisme canadien apres cent ans', supra, note 42, pp. 16, 21-2; 'Liberte
nationale et federalisme' supra note 46, pp. 119-126; Brossard, supra,note 9, pp. 748-50.
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distinct people entitled to choose their own form of political
organization. 1 6 In the words of Morin, the French Canadian nation 'est
un collectivit6 naturelle de culture et de valeurs, historiquement
constituee.. .'07 As was the case with any argument based upon some
version of the compact theory of federation, numerous legal objections
could be raised. For example, it is frequently suggested that the principle
of self-determination applies only in colonial situations,10 8 while the use
of a principle of international law to justify the domestic legality of a
secession is not free from difficulty. 10 9 But'it may once again be observed
both that the demands of law as rhetoric are not the same as the demands
of law 'as law', and that as a realistic legal-constitutional vision of the
position of Quebec within Canada, such an argument cannot be
dismissed as arrant nonsense. As it happens, it is clear enough that the
secession of Quebec, if it comes, will in all probability be justified by its
supporters primarily upon some such peoples-based reasoning, with
arguments centred around breaches of the federal compact playing a
supporting, if important role. So much would seem to follow from the'
essential nature of the grievance of the people of Quebec against Englishspeaking Canada.
Some Canadian legal writers have devoted attention to the very
specific question of the appropriate attitude of the courts within Quebec
to the secession of that Province. 110 The gist of their argument has been
that the courts would be required to uphold the federal regime until such
time as it was 'certain' that a revolutionary secessionist order had been
established. It might be suggested that such writers are rather overplaying their hand in stipulating so onerous a requirement as certainty. Be
that as it may, such arguments clearly assume - on the basis of a
legalistic textual analysis of the Constitution Act 1867 - that it is
inconceivable that a Quebec court would find unilateral secession to be
domestically lawful. Of course, were such a finding to be made, there
would be no need to await a 'certain' revolutionary success, as there
would have been no revolution. The point here is that, in light of the
comments made above, there is no absolute guarantee that the Quebec
courts would make a finding of domestic illegality. It may be that they
would, on one basis or another, uphold such action. Doubtless, the
Supreme Court would disagree, but to put the matter bluntly, its
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107.
108.
109.
110.

Brossard, ibid pp. 171-81.
Morin, supra,note 42, p. 41.
See eg. Buchheit, supra,note 6, pp. 39-40; Matas, supra, note 11, pp. 399-400.
See eg. Mayer, supra,note 22, p. 68.
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jurisdiction over Quebec would have ceased, both in practice, and in the
law of Quebec. Thus, the assumption that the unilateral secession of
Quebec would initially be regarded as illegal within that Province itself,
with all the consequences that this would entail, assumes rather too
much.
It is appropriate here to make some comments concerning the manner
in which federal states handle bids for secession by their constituent
regions, as opposed to the means by which those regions themselves go
about the business of secession. Some matters relevant here have already
been considered. For example, it has been noted that the time to 'handle'
a secessionist impulse is clearly before the stage is reached when secession
has become all but inevitable."'
Unfortunately, it has also been noted that federal states will frequently
not appreciate the seriousness of a secession movement until it is too late,
and this important point bears amplification, or at least further
illustration, in the specific context of a discussion of the reaction of
federal states to secession crises. Thus, in the case of the United States, so
informed a player as Seward was very late in the day mocking the
Southerners for what he saw as their empty threats: 'Who's afraid?
Nobody's afraid; nobody can be bought'' 12 Another commentator wrote
to the same effect: 'As to disunion, nobody but silly people expect it will
happen'. 13 These comments have, one hundred and thirty years later, a
faint but distinct Canadian echo. In the case of Western Australia's bid,
the Commonwealth Government remained convinced of victory in the
secession referendum even after the Prime Minister, who had travelled to
Perth at the eleventh hour, was literally howled down by jeering
crowds." 4 This sort of federal optimism is perhaps touching, but hardly
facilitates the early recognition of the danger of secession, and the making
of a concerted bid to avert it. To an outsider at least, this ready
dismissiveness is one of the major strands in the wider Canadian reaction
to the intense dissatisfaction of Quebec.
There is a further and exacerbating factor to be considered here, and
this is the prevalent tendency of central governments and their supporters
to simply inflame secessionist feeling - once the seriousness of that
feeling has belatedly been recognized - with bellicose threats,
condescension and simple insult. This unhelpful reaction seems to be

111. See Supra, p. 249.
112. K. Stampp, And the War Cane The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-61 (Chicago:
Un. of Chicago Press, 1964).
113. bid, p. 13.
114. Secession, p. 34.
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motivated partly by a logical enough dread of the consequences of
secession, partly by a genuine incomprehension that any region would
wish to leave the joys of the union, and finally by simple anger over the
implicit personal and institutional rejection involved in a bid for
secession. Such a pattern was observable in the American secession
crisis1 5 and was marked in the case of Western Australia. In the latter
instance, the Commonwealth government, having been virtually torpid
throughout the gathering crisis, was so stung by the vote in favour of
secession that it produced (without Parliamentary approval) a book
11 6
setting out its views on the matter, and entitled The Case for Union.
This publication was then distributed to every elector in every
conceivably disaffected State, including Western Australia. In both tone
and content it was arrogant, dismissive and pompous, and succeeded only
in exciting outrage in Western Australia, resentment throughout much of
11 7
the remainder of the country, and dismay in London.
Naturally, this type of inflamatory behaviour on the part of a federal
government will be particularly counter-productive if feeling within a
disaffected region is already such that the remainder of the federation is
seen as arrogant, domineering and supercilious. There can, of course, be
little doubt that such is the feeling of many Quebecois towards the rest of
Canada, with references to the 'arrogance satisfaite et dominatrice du
peuple majoritaire"' 8 being a standard part of the debate over Quebec's
future. Moreover, in the wake of the acerbic debate over Meech Lake,
with its constant criticisms of the position of Quebec, and with the failure
of the agreement rightly or wrongly being seen by many as a rejection by
Canada of Quebec, this feeling has only intensified. Regrettably, it will
doubtless continue to intensify so long as many leading English-speaking
Canadians publicly dismiss the grievances of Quebec with a lofty disdain
that seems sometimes to approach contempt. 19
Of course, real accommodation always remains at least a theoretical
option for a federal state faced with a secession movement. Unfortunately, if the danger is appreciated only at a late stage, when secessionist
grievance has already become an established fact of political life, and if
the federal government has hitherto acted so as only to intensify that
grievance, the_ outlook for careful negotiation leading to thoughtful
115. Stamp, supra, note 112, pp. 1-13.
116. Commonwealth of Australia, The Casefor Union: A Reply to the Casefor Secession of
the State of Western Australia(1938).
117. Secession. p. 35,42-43.
118. Brossard, supra, note 9, p. 240.
119. See eg. E. Forsey, 'Can Canada get by without Quebec? Absolutely', Globe andMail
September 20-21, 1990.
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compromise is not good. Every attempt to negotiate a settlement before
the American Civil War failed in the face of mutual intransigence, while
the Commonwealth of Australia was essentially uninterested in
negotiations with Western Australia. All in all, accommodation will
typically have a hard row to hoe in any fully-matured secession crisis.
Nevertheless, of all the options, accommodation is that which should
most closely be examined. Unfortunately, supporters of a federal
government are often too blinded by resentment over the seceding
region's 'treachery', 'blindness' or 'ingratitude' to do much more than hurl
inflammatory accusations and counter-accusations. Yet, to the federal
state, the true question must always be as to the value which it places
upon the presence of the dissentient region within the union. If that value
is high, then it may well be worth paying a correspondingly high price to
retain it. The real issue must therefore be whether there are any steps the
taking of which might avert secession, and which would be less painful
than the disruption of the federation. If there are, then it follows that such
measures, however unpalatable initially, should be adopted. Interestingly,
in the case of Australia, after Western Australia's bid to secede was
thwarted by the Imperial Parliament, the Commonwealth found that, on
reflection, certain discrete adjustments could be made to the financial
structure of the federation which had the effect of improving the position
of that State.120 Western Australia is still part of the Australian
Federation.
In the event that the prospect of Quebec's secession becomes even
more threatening, the basic equation for Canadians will be equally
simple. On the (large) assumption that accommodation is still possible on
both sides, is Quebec worth more to the Canadian federation than the
price of keeping her in? In this equation, resentment and irritation
towards what may be regarded as Quebec's irrational behaviour are
simply irrelevant. Moreover, any concessions made in the name of
keeping Quebec in Canada are, on this analysis, -ultimately concessions
made for the sake of Canada, not Quebec. Whatever the issue may be for
the Quebecois, the issue for English-speaking Canadians will not be
whether they are doing Quebec a favour, but whether they will be doing
themselves a favour. This is an issue which only Canadians can decide.
There is at least one further option open to a federal state, on the
assumption that it has rejected resentful inertia, empty-handed persuasion
and serious accommodation. That is for it to use force in order to coerce
120. See R. Anderson, 'The States and Relations with the Commonwealth' in R. ElseMitchell, ed., Essays on the Australian Constitution, (Sydney: Law Book Co. of Australia,
1952), pp. 94, 121.
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the errant region back into the Union, or to prevent it from leaving in the
first place. It is popularly supposed that in 'civilized' and peaceful
federations this grim possibility is a theoretical option only, but this is to
rather over-state the position. History in fact shows that hitherto pacific
federal governments, when faced with the departure of a significant
portion of the population and territory of the federation, may well resort
to force to prevent that eventuality, especially if force seems likely to
succeed. America is the obvious paradigm case, but Western Australia
was subjected to increasingly explicit threats of armed intervention,121
while the proclamation of the War Measures Act in Quebec in 1970,
though actuated by particular and extraordinary circumstances, is not to
be ignored. 122 Indeed, in assessing what is to be born in order to avoid the
secession of a region, it will always be wise for the population of the
federal state concerned to appreciate that the exact course which a
secession crisis may take is as unpredictable as any other profoundly
disturbing political upheaval, and that more may be involved than terse
1
farewells. 23
Quite apart from questions concerning the means by which a region
may promote secession and a federal government oppose it, any secession
will raise a vast number of associated legal and political issues, far too
numerous to be considered here. The point is made, however, that were
Quebec to secede from Canada, the institutional and other adjustments
thereby rendered necessary would be prodigious. Perhaps one of the most
difficult questions would be that relating to stranded minorities. 24 When
a federal region secedes, it will not infrequently be the case that certain
of its citizens will wish to stay within the Union. Such was the position
of the people of that part of Virginia which ultimately became West
Virginia, and a similar sentiment was present in the eastern part of
Western Australia. What would be the position in Quebec? Would some
anglophone minority wish to secede from the seceding Province? Might
this be true of native peoples? The difficulty for a seceding region will
always be that having itself fractured the previous federal union, it will
often be in a weak position - both morally and politically -

to resist

a similar attempt upon its own integrity. However, this is not the place to
.consider the variety of issues which would inevitably arise consequent
121. Secession, p.42,53.
122. See ag. (W. Tarnapolsky, The CanadianBill ofRights 2nd ed., (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1975), p. 331-48.
123. It is interesting in this context that some French-Canadian writers go to the trouble of
specifically denying the legitimacy of the use of force to return a seceding region to the federal
nest. See e-g. Brossard, supra, note 9, p.95 .
124. See e.g. Buchheit, supra,note 6, pp. 29-30.
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upon the secession of Quebec: 125 the example of stranded minorities is
offered only by way of illustrating the complexity of such issues.
V. Conclusion
This article has merely sought to discuss in general terms some aspects of
the problem of secession in federal states, in the light of the experience of
federations other than Canada, and in an attempt to make that experience
relevant to the present controversy over the future status of Quebec. It
offers no predictions as to the outcome of that controversy, and certainly
no solutions. What is perhaps suggested, is that there do tend to be
patterns in secession crises within federal states. Secession movements are
motivated by particular factors, are pursued in certain ways, and provoke
similar reactions from their opponents. To this extent, it is not difficult to
detect points of similarity between the present situation in Canada, and
such events as those which took place in Australia during the 1930s, and
even those which occurred in the United States during the 1860s. Given
the ultimate course of those events, these similarities are troubling to
anyone hopeful of the continuance of Canada. Any such person must
hope that all Canadians will carefully consider what lessons may be held
by the past, with a view to ensuring that they are not painfully relearned
on Canadian soil.

125. The entire second part of Brossard's work, (supra,note 9), is devoted to a consideration
of such issues.

